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THE COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE IN CALIFORNIA
By WILLIAM M. LUKENS*
A CONFLICT between the right to appeal and the policy favoring
one final judgment has given rise to what is known as the collateral
order doctrine.1 Fundamentally, the right to appeal from an order, de-
cree or judgment does not vest until the final judgment.2 To allow an
earlier appeal would result in a piecemeal disposition of the case
causing unnecessary delay and expense.' Hence, an appeal can be taken
only from a final judgment.4
The Doctrine
There are, however, many interlocutory orders where an immediate
appeal is necessary to avoid irreparable injury. For instance, an errone-
ous interlocutory order dissolving an injunction which prohibited the
tearing down of a party's house would result in irremedial loss if such
an order were not immediately appealable. In order to prevent such an
injury, section 963 of the California Code of Civil Procedure provides
that an appeal may be taken not only from a "final judgment entered
in an action, or special proceeding,"5 but also from specified interlocu-
tory orders.'
There are also many interlocutory orders not specified in the statute
which cause similar hardships. In order to bring these situations with-
in the statute, courts have broadened the interpretation of final
judgment. If final means the last in an action, there can be only one
final judgment in an action and thus only one appeal.' Therefore, final
is construed to refer to a determination of the rights of the parties in
relation to the matter in controversy! Thus, there may be several final
* Member, Second Year Class.
1 See Comment, 70 HARv. L. REv. 555 (1957).
'Pahl v. Ribero, 193 Cal. App. 2d 154, 14 Cal. Rptr. 174 (1961) ; Scarbery v. Bill Patch
Land & Water Co., 170 Cal. App. 2d 368, 338 P.2d 916 (1959) ; Comment, 15 So. CAL. L.
REV. 504 (1942).
'Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Say. Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 2d 697, 122
P.2d 316 (1942).
'Nolan v. Smith, 137 Cal. 360, 70 Pac. 166 (1902) ; David v. Goodman, 89 Cal. App. 2d
162, 200 P.2d 568 (1948).
'CAL. CODE CIV. Paoc. § 963(1).
' CAL. CODE CrV. PROC. § 963(2).
'Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 2d 697, 122 P.2d
316 (1942).
'Stockton Combined Harvester & Agricultural Works v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 98 Cal. 557,
33 Pac. 633 (1893) ; Potvin v. Pacific Greyhound Lines Inc., 130 Cal. App. 510, 20 P.2d 129
(1933).
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judgments in an action because there may be several matters in contro-
versy upon which a decision is rendered.
Under this definition of final, two more requirements are necessary
in order that the judgment be final for purposes of appeal: the matter
in controversy must be collateral to the main issue,9 and the order must
direct the payment of money by appellant or the performance of an
act by or against him."0 These elements constitute what is known as the
collateral order doctrine, and thus, what merely would have been an
interlocutory order under the "last in an action" definition of final, has
become a final judgment itself. Instead of recognizing an exception to
the final judgment rule, courts have applied the word final to such
interlocutory decisions in a sense quite foreign to the true sense of the
rule;" hence, the expression "final for purposes of appeal."' 2
The concept of collaterality is not difficult to understand. There are
some issues in the course of litigation that are distinct and severable
from the main issue."3 A decision on such an issue would determine
finally the rights of the parties and would leave no further judicial acts
to be done by the court in regard to that issue. But if the preliminary
order seeks the same overall objective as the main issue, it is not appeal-
able under the collateral order doctrine.' 4
As pointed out in Sjoberg v. Hastorf,'5 to be appealable "it is not
sufficient that the order determine finally for the purposes of further
proceedings in the trial court some distinct issue in the case; it must
direct the payment of money by appellant or the performance of an act
by or against him."' This requirement has been the subject of some
confusion in California.
Edlund v. Los Altos Builders, 106 Cal. App. 2d 350, 235 P.2d 28 (1951).
"o Sjoberg v. Hastorf, 33 Cal. 2d 116, 199 P.2d 668 (1948) ; Fish v. Fish, 216 Cal. 14, 13
P.2d 375 (1932) ; Free Gold Mining Co. v. Spiers, 135 Cal. 130, 67 Pac. 61 (1901) ; City of
Los Angeles v. Los Angeles City Water Co., 134 Cal. 121, 66 Pac. 198 (1901) ; Grant v. Su-
perior Court, 106 Cal. 324, 39 Pae. 604 (1895) ; Efron v. Kalmanovitz, 185 Cal. App. 2d 149,
8 Cal. Rptr. 107 (1960).
1' Comment, 33 HARV. L. REv. 1076 (1920).
12 Meehan v. Hopps, 45 Cal. 2d 213, 217, 288 P.2d 267, 270 (1955).
12 3 WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Appeal § 11 (1954).
1, Bakewell v. Bakewell, 21 Cal. 2d 224, 130 P.2d 975 (1942) ; City of Los Angeles v.
Schweitzer, 200 Cal. App. 2d 448, 19 Cal. Rptr. 429 (1962) ; People v. Bales, 180 Cal. App.
2d 16, 4 Cal. Rptr. 205 (1960) ; Scarbery v. Bill Patch Land & Water Co., 170 Cal. App. 2d
368, 338 P.2d 916 (1959) ; Miller v. Stein, 145 Cal. App. 2d 381, 302 P.2d 403 (1956).
12 33 Cal. 2d 116, 199 P.2d 668 (1948).
16 Id. at 119, 199 P.2d at 670. (Emphasis added.)
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A Broadening of the Doctrine; an Illusory Trend
Two recent cases seem to indicate a relaxation of the "payment of
money or performance of an act" requirement, and therefore a broaden-
ing of the collateral order doctrine. But a close analysis indicates that
the requirement still remains.
In Meehan v. Hopps'1 an appeal was allowed from an order deny-
ing a motion to enjoin opposing counsel from participating in the case.
The court purported to base appealability on two grounds: first, that
section 963(2) expressly provides for an appeal where an injunction is
denied; and second, that the collateral order doctrine applied. Thus,
the court appeared to apply the collateral order doctrine without re-
quiring a payment of money or some other act by or against the appel-
lant. However, a subsequent case, Efron v. Kalmanovitz,' s explained
that the appeal was allowed in Meehan solely on the basis of injunction,
and that the reference to the collateral order doctrine
... was concerned only with the question of collaterality and finality.
The briefs of both parties in Meehan cited Sjoberg v. Hastori, supra,
and there is nothing in the opinion in Meehan indicating an intent to
delimit or overrule Sjoberg and its own decisions cited in Sjoberg to the
effect that not only must the order of a collateral issue be final to be
appealable, but that it must also direct the payment of money by appel-
lant or the performance of an act or against him.' 9
Other decisions, not led astray by Meehan, have relied on Sjoberg
in holding orders nonappealable which deny motions to reform a fire
insurance policy,20 to amend the complaint, 2 and to correct minutes. 2
However, Meehan has been cited as authority for allowing an appeal
from one particular order which neither directs the payment of money
nor the performance of an act. In Berry v. Chrome Crankshaft Co. 2' and
in Getrost v. Lanha 24 an appeal was allowed from an order denying a
motion to disqualify defendant's attorney. Since a motion to disqualify
an attorney could be framed, as in Meehan, as a motion to enjoin the
attorney from participating in the case, allowing the appeal in these
two cases might be justified under the injunction provision of section
17 45 Cal. 2d 213, 288 P.2d 267 (1955).
1 185 Cal. App. 2d 149, 8 Cal. Rptr. 107 (1960).
1 9 d. at 156, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 111.
" Maier Brewing Co. v. Pacific Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 194 Cal. App. 2d 494, 15 Cal. Rptr.
177 (1961).
" Hixon v. Hixon, 146 Cal. App. 2d 204, 303 P.2d 607 (1956).
"Simmons v. Santa Barbara Ice & Cold Storage Co., 162 Cal. App. 2d 23, 327 P.2d 141
(1958).
" 159 Cal. App. 2d 549, 324 P.2d 70 (1958).
" 200 Cal. App. 2d 801, 19 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1962).
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963(2). However, the form of the motion appears in neither opinion,
and section 963 was cited by neither court. It is therefore unclear
whether appealability was based upon an order denying an injunction or
upon the collateral order doctrine.
The second case which departed from the Sjoberg requirement is
Hersch v. Boston Ins. Co.25 In that case an order granting a lien upon
plaintiff's cause of action was held appealable. The court quoted Wit-
kin,2" who mentions a direction to pay money or perform some other
act as an example of the collateral order doctrine rather than a require-
ment.
Both Witkin and the court in Sjoberg cite Fish v. Fish2 ' as one of
their authorities. That case held that an order settling a receiver's ac-
count, fixing his compensation, and directing sale of receivership prop-
erty to pay such compensation was appealable by a party to the main
action, since in effect it was an order for the doing of an act against
such party. Although the opinion states that orders requiring payment
of money by the party complaining or the doing of an act by or against
him2" are usually regarded as final against such party and may be
appealed by him, the court went on to say that an order would not be ap-
pealable if it did not direct the payment of any money or the perform-
ance of any act by or against the complaining party. Such an order
would lack one of the essential elements of a final judgment.29 Witkin
recognized this distinction in his 1961 Supplement wherein he added
that a direction for the payment of money or performance of some
other act was a necessary element to the collateral order doctrine.3"
Nevertheless, Witkin took advantage of the Hersch case, as well as the
Meehan case, to indicate a trend toward the broadening of the collateral
order doctrine." But it is offered that neither Meehan nor Hersch show
a tendency to eliminate the requirement set forth in Sjoberg. Meehan
based appealability on section 963(2) which expressly provides for an
appeal from orders refusing to grant an injunction." Hersch, on the
25175 Cal. App. 2 d 751, 346 P.2d 796 (1959).
26 3 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Appeal § 11 (1954).
2' 216 Cal. 14, 13 P.2d 375 (1932).
2 8 d. at 16, 13 P.2d at 375.
29 Id. at 17, 13 P.2d at 376.
20 3 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Appeal § 11 (Supp. 1961).
"Ibid.
22 Efron v. Kalmanovitz, 185 Cal. App. 2d 149, 8 Cal. Rptr. 107 (1960).
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other hand, relied upon a statement made in Witkin, California Pro-
cedure, which has since been revised.3"
Drafting the Motion
Whether or not an appeal will lie depends upon the wording used
by the lawyer in drafting the motion. If an attorney moves for an
order "directing" a receiver to pay money or perform an act against a
party to the action, that party may appeal under the collateral order
doctrine if the order is granted. 4 But if the attorney moves for an
order "authorizing" the receiver to pay money or perform an act
against a party to the action, no appeal will lie if the order is granted
because the order has not complied with the requirement that it be a
direction to pay money or perform an act.3" The justification is that if an
appeal could be taken every time a receiver was authorized to do
something, there would be undue delay and expense." However, in
substance the order is the same whether the receiver is authorized or
directed.
Until the Supreme Court of California makes clear the doctrine of
Meehan, lawyers must word their motions with utmost care. If the
lawyer fears that his motion will be denied, he should use words of an
injunctive nature so that the denial of his motion will be specifically
appealable under section 963(2)." But if a lawyer is reasonably cer-
tain that his motion will be granted, he should word his motion in such
language that the order will not direct the payment of money or some
other act. If the court still follows the doctrine of Sjoberg v. Hastorf,3 s
then his adversary will be unable to appeal from an order lacking the
direction to pay. That an appeal may hinge merely on the wording of
a motion is a retrogression to the conditions that resulted in the abolition
of the common law forms of action.
Conclusion
The requirement that the order direct the payment of money or per-
formance of some other act by or against the appellant seems to be
peculiar to California. The result of this additional restriction has been
to preclude an immediate appeal from erroneous orders whose in-
" 3 WITKiN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Appeal § 11 (Supp. 1961).
" Fish v. Fish, 216 Cal. 14, 13 P.2d 375 (1932).
" Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. California Dev. Co., 159 Cal. 484, 114 Pac. 838 (1911) ; Free
Gold Mining Co. v. Spiers, 135 Cal. 130, 67 Pac. 61 (1901).
"6 Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. California Dev. Co., supra note 35, at 492, 114 Pac. at 841.
"7 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 963 (2).
38 33 Cal. 2d 116, 199 P.2d 668 (1948).
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jurious effects cannot be removed by reversal on appeal from a sub-
sequent "final" judgment.
The collateral order doctrine serves a useful purpose because it acts
as a safety valve allowing appeals to be taken immediately from orders
not specifically appealable by statute. But there are still many orders
where nonappealability would cause undue hardships, which do not
fulfill all the requirements of the collateral order doctrine simply be-
cause they do not direct the payment of money or the doing of some
other act. 9 A legislative remedy lies in the adoption of discretionary
appeals as has been done in the federal courts
40 and in many states.41
This would eliminate the practice of perverting the definition of final
judgment that necessarily arises in the application of the collateral order
doctrine. However, if the legislature fails to correct the problem, the
courts should provide a judicial remedy. A broadening of the present
construction of the definition of final judgment by eliminating the
requirement that an order must direct the payment of money or some
other act would be a long stride in the right direction.
" Because of Meehan, a denial of a motion to disqualify opposing counsel seems to have
fallen out of this category. Getrost v. Lanham, 200 Cal. App. 2d 801, 19 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1962).
"0 28 U.S.C. § 1292.
" IowA R. Civ. PRo. 332; MAss. ANN. LAws, ch. 231 § 111; Miss. CODE ANN. § 1148;
N.J. RuLEs, 2:2-3; W. Va. CODE ANN. § 5787.
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